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The consumption-saving choices of economic agents are driven by intertemporal utility
trade-o®s between current and future consumption. Any inter-temporal decision mak-
ing process can be broken down into basically two components: First, the rate of time
preference, i.e., how much importance agents give to the future, and second, the rate of
return on savings, i.e., the reward for foregoing current consumption. Economic theory
predicts that individuals who give more importance to future would defer consumption of
a larger portion their current income to future. The consumption foregone can be utilized
for investment in a productive activity which would increase consumption possibilities in
the future.
Solow's ([12]) neo-classical model of growth, which is also the benchmark model for
analyzing growth related issues focuses on the second aspect of this economic decision
making process. According to the neo-classical model, when an economy is poor, that
is, it has very little capital to work with, the rate of return on investment is very high.
This induces people to save and invest more, and the economy embarks on the process of
growth and development. As societies accumulate more capital the return on investment
declines and hence people become less thrifty. The process of accumulation of capital goes
on until the society reaches its desired level of capital and output.
An important implication of the neo-classical model is that poorer economies would
grow at a more rapid rate than richer economies provided they have access to the same
technology. In long run, all economies converge to the same level of capital and output.
The initial conditions of an economy do not play any role in determining the long-run
level of a²uence of an economy. This implication of the neo-classical model is commonly
referred to as the convergence hypothesis. Subsequent empirical studies have failed to
vindicate the convergence hypothesis, however, there is evidence of convergence among
the OECD countries. This phenomenon called club convergence implies that rates of
growth rates of economies with similar levels of a²uence will tend to converge.
One of the common features of most models of growth is that all individuals give
the same amount of importance to the future and that weight is assumed to be an ex-
ogenously given parameter called subjective discount factor. Usually it is assumed that
the discount factor is less than one, implying that people give less importance to futureconsumption in comparison to current consumption. One possible economic rationale be-
hind this assumption may be that there is a chance that an agent may not survive to the
future period to reap the bene¯ts of his current savings. However, assuming the discount
factor to be same for all agents requires some careful analysis. Treating the discount
factor as an exogenously given parameter, makes the preferences of agents seperable over
time and hence greatly simpli¯es the analysis of their optimal consumption-savings de-
cisions. This technical simplicity comes at a cost of economic plausibility. Uzawa([13])
and Koopmans([7]) ¯rst introduced the possibility of discount factors to be determined
endogenously by allowing the preferences of agents to be recursive. Their approach was
extended and studied in greater detail by Epstein([4]), Iwai([6]) and Obstfeld([10]). Both
Epstein and Obstfeld assumed the discount factor of agents to be decreasing in the level of
consumption. This behavioral assumption regarding the discount factors basically implies
that agents become more impatient as they grow richer and their level of consumption
rises. While they acknowledge that there may be equally compelling reasons to believe
that people become more patient as they grow richer, they work with this behavior of
discount rates as it ensures a unique steady state which is also stable. They conclude that
the long-run level of consumption and output of an economy is unique and independent
of the initial conditions, a result very similar to the neo-classical model.
In this paper, we interpret the discount rate as the probability of an agent surviving
to the next period. We allow this probability of survival to be determined endogenously.
The probability of survival is increasing as the agents current level of consumption in-
creases. Hence, the importance given to the future is in°uenced by his endowment of
wealth and other productive factors. We draw this relationship from the vast literature
in development economics which have recorded the e®ect of malnutrition and undernour-
ishment on the economic behavior of individuals. Individuals who cannot a®ord certain
subsistence level of consumption are trapped in poverty and save very little. On the other
hand, there is another section of population called the \middle class" which have recorded
signi¯cant improvements in their real income in the development experience of countries
like India. We attempt to explain these by studying the e®ect of initial endowment of
wealth on the saving investment choice of individuals when the rate of time preference is
allowed to vary.
At this point we would like to point out that the basic di®erence of our paper fromrest of the literature. In our model, an individual's probability of surviving to a future
period is increasing with his current level of consumption. This has the e®ect of decreasing
the rate of time preference as current consumption of an individual rises. This assumption
is not only has a certain economic rationale, it also has been found to be true in empirical
studies. Ogaki and Atkeson([11]) in their study of panel data on three village districts in
India, ¯nd that the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution rises with the level of wealth.
The rate of time preference is not allowed to di®er according to their model. Lawrance([8])
in her study on inter-temporal preferences based on U.S. panel data ¯nds that subjective
rate of time preference is about three to ¯ve percentage points higher for households with
lower incomes than those with higher incomes. Controlling for race and education widens
this di®erence even more. These results suggest one possible explanation for the observed
heterogeneity in savings behavior across socioeconomic classes within a society as well as
across di®erent societies with di®erent levels of a²uence. This kind of behavior also has
signi¯cant policy implications. Higher rates of time preference may reduce investment in
education and thereby induce a negative relation between time preference and long-run
income. Also, poor households will give less importance to the future and have a higher
marginal propensity to consume which would adversely a®ect their savings-investment
behavior.
A similar theoretical approach as ours was taken by Mantel([9]), where he studies the
impact of decreasing rate of time preference on the optimal growth path of an economy.
However, Mantel's primary focus was to study the monotonocity properties of optimal
consumption and investment paths.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our model and presents
our basic results. Results concerning the steady states are presented in section 3. In sec-
tion 4 we study the stability properties of the steady states. Section 5 provides a discussion
of the results and we conclude in section 6 with some possible research questions.
2 The Model
Consider a closed economy in a one-good world. The good can be used for either consump-
tion or investment. The production of this good requires two kinds of inputs, labor(N)and capital(K). There are a large number of competetive ¯rms having the same con-
stant returns to scale production technology. The aggregate production function of the
economy in every period is described by
Yt = F(Kt;N) (1)
Our economy consists of a representative agent who seeks to maximize his lifetime welfare.
The agent derives his income from selling productive factors in every period. The agent's
endowment of labor is assumed to be constant in every period. However, the capital can
change over time depending on the savings decision of the agent. The agent, given the
initial endowment of capital, has to decide his consumption and savings.
At any period t there is a chance that the agent will not survive to the next period
t+1. The agent's probability of surviving to the next period depends on his current period
consumption. If the agent's current period consumption is below a certain subsistence level
of consumption(C), then the agent's probability of survival is extremely low(¯). As the
consumption increases from this subsistence level the probability of survival also increases
until consumption rises to a level of basic comfort(C), where the agents probability of
survival reaches a maximum(¯) and becomes insensitive to the changes in consumption.
Thus, the probability of survival(½t;t+1) from any period t to period t + 1 is a continuous
function of consumption at time t in the following way:
½t;t+1 =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
¯ < 1 if Ct < C
¯(Ct) if Ct 2 [C;C]
¯ < 1 if Ct >C
(2)
where ¯0(Ct) > 0, if Ct 2 [C;C] and ¯ < ¯. Suppose the agent has to choose a path of
consumption and savings at period 0 to maximize his lifetime welfare. The weight given
to future consumption will depend on the agent's probability of surviving to that future
date. Let the probability of surviving to period t be denoted by ½0;t. These probabilities
are the discount factors of the agent in his intertemporal maximization problem. Let us
take note of some properties of the discount factors ½0;t which will help in simplifying our
analysis in future.













Kt+1 = F(Kt;N) + (1 ¡ ±)Kt ¡ Ct ,
and a transversality condition
lim
t¡!1½0;tKt ¸ 0 . (TC)
The agent's period utility function is U(Ct) and ± is the depreciation rate of capital where,
0 < ± < 1. At this point we make some assumptions concerning the functions U(:) and
¯(:) to ensure that the necessary conditions for maximum are also su±cient.
(A1) U(Ct) > 0, U0(Ct) > 0, U00(Ct) < 0.
(A2) 0 < ¯(Ct) < 1, ¯0(Ct) > 0 and ¯00(Ct) < 0 for Ct 2 [C;C].
(A3) F(0;0) = 0, FK(:) > 0, FKK(:) < 0, lim
K!0 FK(:) = 1




f½0;t U(Ct) + e ¸t[F(Kt;N) + (1 ¡ ±)Kt ¡ Ct ¡ Kt+1]g :







U(Cs) = e ¸t ,
e ¸t = e ¸t+1[FK(Kt+1;N) + 1 ¡ ±] .








Át+1 , where Át+1 is the present discounted value of future consumption from period t+1
onwards. The ¯rst order conditions can now be re-written asU
0(Ct) + ¯
0(Ct) Át+1 = ¸t , (3)
¸t = ¸t+1¯(Ct) [FK(Kt+1;N) + 1 ¡ ±] , (4)
and
Kt+1 = F(Kt;N) + (1 ¡ ±)Kt ¡ Ct . (5)
Note that U00(Ct) + ¯00(Ct) Át+1 < 0 since the functions U(:) and ¯(:) are concave. Thus
the second order condition for maximum is also satis¯ed. Substituting (3) in (4) we get,
U0(Ct) + ¯0(Ct) Át+1
¯(Ct)[U0(Ct+1) + ¯0(Ct+1) Át+2]
= [FK(Kt+1;N) + 1 ¡ ±] . (6)
Notice that the variable Át, the present discounted value of utilities from period t onwards,
evolves in the following fashion:
Át = U(Ct) + ¯(Ct) Át+1 for all t ¸ 1 . (7)




t=1 such that (5), (6), (7) and TC hold for a given K0.
Equation (5) is the intertemporal budget constraint of the agent. Equation (6) which
is derived from (3) and (4) tells us that the loss in welfare due to foregoing consumption
in period t has to equal the discounted value of gain in welfare from period t+1 onwards.
This condition is commonly referred to as the Fisher equation.
3 Steady-state Equilibria
Let us ¯rst study the steady state solutions to the di®erence equations (5), (6), (7) . In a
steady state Ct = Ct+1 = C, Kt = Kt+1 = K and Á =
U(C)
1¡¯(C) for all t. In a steady state,
equations (5) and (6) reduce to
C = F(K;N) ¡ ±K , (BC)and
¯(C) [FK(K;N) + 1 ¡ ±] = 1 . (RR)
Equation (RR) is the steady state counterpart of the Fisher's intertemporal optimum.
Equation (BC) gives us the locus of points along which the agent's consumption and
capital stock are constant and satisfy the budget constraint. We are going to restrict
our attention to only the positively sloped part of the BC curve1. The slope of RR
curve in consumption-capital plane is given by
¡FKK(K;N)¯2
¯0(C) which is always positive from
our assumptions. We will soon derive the conditions for the existence of a steady state
equilibrium. However, assuming those conditions hold, plotting BC and RR curves on
consumption-capital plane shows that there could be multiple steady state solutions to
the agent's problem(see Figure 1). We characterize the steady states as two types. A
steady state is of type \H" (or SSH) if the slope of RR curve is greater than BC curve
and of type \L" (or SSL) otherwise. The existence of various kinds of steady states is
characterized in a series of lemmas and propositions. The ¯rst lemma provides us with a
bound on the steady state levels of capital.
Lemma 1 In any steady state solution to the agent's problem the steady state level of
capital stock K 2 [K;K] , where K satis¯es [FK(:;N) + (1 ¡ ±)] ¯ = 1 and K satis¯es
[FK(:;N) + (1 ¡ ±)] ¯ = 1 .
Proof: See the appendix.
The result follows from the steady state equation (RR) and says that the possible steady
state capital levels are bounded within an interval which is determined by the minimum
and maximum value of the discount factors. However between these bounds there may be
more than one steady state equilibrium. The next proposition characterizes the number
and type of such equilibria.
Proposition 1 If the subsistence level of consumption(C) is equal to zero, then the steady
state level of capital is strictly greater than K . There exists at least one steady state of
1The slope of BC curve is FK(K;N)¡± . This slope is positive for low values of capital and becomes
negative after capital increases beyond the point where FK(K;N) = ±. According to RR in a steady
state FK(K;N)+1¡± = [¯(C)]¡1. If FK(K;N) < ± then FK(K;N)+1¡± < 1, which is a contradiction
since [¯(C)]¡1 is always greater than one.type \H". If there exists \n" steady states of type \H", then there must be \(n-1)" steady
states of type \L".
Proof: See the appendix.
The following lemma establishes a su±cient condition for the existence of at least one
steady state of type \L".
Lemma 2 Let C = 0 and FK(K;N) > ± and K1 denote the lowest steady state level of
capital. If there exists a K0 > K1 such that ¯¡1( 1
FK(K0;N)+1¡±) < F(K0;N) ¡ ±K0; then
there exists at least one steady state of type \L" and two steady states of type \H".
Proof: See the appendix.
In the subsequent analysis we are going to assume the requirement of lemma 2 is
satis¯ed and the economy has two steady states of type \H" with an intermediate steady
state of type \L". All the intresting qualitative properties of the model can be studied
within such a setup. We ¯rst study the local stability properties of the steady states.
4 Local equlibria
The stability of the steady states will depend on the behavior of the C, K and Á around
steady state. Log-linearization of the ¯rst order conditions around steady state yields a
system of di®erence equations in b Ct, b Át and c Kt where `^' denotes percentage deviation of
the variable from its steady state value. The dynamical system can be expressed as
2
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,and ¢2 is a weighted average of the elasticity of the period utility function and the discount
factor at the steady state. Details of the derivation of equation (8) and the components
of matrix M are provided in the appendix. The roots of the polynomial det[M ¡¹I] are
going to determine the local stability properties of any steady state equlibrium. In this
context we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Any steady state of type \H" is a saddle path and locally unique. Any
steady state of type \L" is locally unstable.
Proof: See the appendix.
If an economy is endowed with a level of capital stock close to a steady state capital
of type \H" then the economy will converge to that steady state level of capital. Howver
the steady states of type \L" are unstable. So far we have asumed that the agent is pre-
fectly informed about the e®ect of his current consumption on his probability of survival.
However, the results will not change he fails to internalize this e®ect.
Proposition 3 If the agent fails to internalize the e®ect of consumption on the probability
of survival, the possible steady state equilibria to the agent's optimization problem and their
local stability properties are una®ected.
Proof: See the appendix.
5 Long run output and Poverty traps
Depending on the initial level of capital, the economy might have three possible steady
states. The pair (Kp;Cp) denotes a situation like poverty trap. One the other hand the
pair (Kh;Ch) is the high level equilibrium. Both these steady states are locally stable
and unique. The pair (Ku;Cu) is the unstable steady state(see Figure 2). This kind
of behavior is very similar to Becker, Murphy and Tamura([3]) model with endogenous
fertility. In the ¯rst part of their paper, human capital was the only accumulable factor.
If the initial level of human capital was too low, it resulted in investment in education
of children being too expensive as opposed to having more children. If the initial capital
stock is su±ciently high then individuals have less children and invest on their education.
There was an intermediate unstable steady state. The long run fertility behavior of the
economy was dependent on the initial capital stock. In the latter half of their paperthey introduced another accumulable factor in form of physical capital. It is shown that
depending on initial level of human capital the economy may have two di®erent growth
rates. If the initial endowment of human capital is very low the economy exhibits an
under-development equilibrium, in which there is no investment in human capital and
there is no growth. If the initial endowment of human capital is above a critical level the
economy invests in both the productive assets and shows a steady long run growth. The
introduction of human capital accumulation of the kind assumed in Becker, Murphy and
Tamura([3]) would result in the possibility of two distinct growth rates in our model also.
A detailed discussion of that scenario falls beyond the scope of the present essay.
In our model the causes of an economy falling into a poverty trap are slightly dif-
ferent. If an individual is extremely poor, then he gives less weight to future and hence
his saving and investment behavior is adversely e®ected. The economy may be stuck at a
low-level equilibrium as a result of perfectly rational intertemporal decision process. This
kind of behavior is called investment in patience by Becker and Mulligan([2]).
The population and hence the labor force is assumed to be constant in our economy.
It means that each agent is replaced with another on his death. An alternative interpre-
tation of our set up is that every individual lives for one period and at the end of that
period he leaves behind some bequest. This bequest depends on the importance given to
the welfare of the future generations. For individuals who are poor this altruistic motive
is weaker, and future generations of their dynasty are hence trapped in poverty. This was
the motivation behind the Galor and Zierra ([5]) paper. In their model certain individuals
are not able to invest in human capital and hence get trapped in poverty because their
previous generations didn't leave any bequest. At this point we should point out that
their qualitative results are very similar to what we derive.
So far we have assumed that the subsistence level of consumption (C) is zero. How-
ever, if this level of consumption becomes too high then the steady state level of capital
will be at its lowest possible level. The following proposition formalizes impact of subsis-
tence and basic comfort level of consumptions on the steady state equilibria.
Proposition 4 If the subsistence level of consumption(C) is greater than the F(K;N)¡
±K then there exists a steady state equilibrium where K = K and C = F(K;N)¡±K. If
the level of basic comfort(C) is less than F(K;N) ¡ ±K then there exists a steady stateequilibrium where K = K and C = F(K;N) ¡ ±K. Moreover both the steady states are
saddle paths and locally unique.
Proof: See the appendix.
If the subsistence level of consumption is very high compared to the initial capital
stock of the economy there is little incentive to save and accumulate capital. The economy
will ¯nd itself stuck at a low level equilibrium with the lowest possible level of capital and
output. On the other hand once the probability of survival reaches its maximum possible
level the additional incentive to save goes away and the economy is content to be at its
highest desirable capital stock K.
If this economy was a small open economy which could borrow any amount of funds
at a given world intersest rate, then there would be a unique steady state. The arbitrage
opportunities would imply that the world interest rate equals domestic rate return on
capital. However, if the economy faces credit rationing then possibility of multiple steady
states would arise.
6 Conclusion
The traditional theories of development predict that as an economy embarks on growth
path the size of its backward sector is going to decline. However experiences in Latin
American, African and some Asian countries have shown that the presence of the backward
sector has been very persistent. The neo-classical growth model predicts improvement in
welfare as the economy accumulates more capital. Those models assume exogenous time
preference and hence the possibility of poverty traps completely escape their purview. We
have provided an alternative motivation behind an economy getting trapped at a low-level
equilibrium.
We show that it may be possible that a economy with very little capital and output
shows no growth at all while a richer economy exhibits a positive rate of growth. This
occurs because the poorer economy may be trapped in a low level equilibrium while the
richer economy shows positive growth in its endeavour to attain a higher level of steady
state output. Unlike the neo-classical model history of an economy has an imprtant role
in the process of development.An interesting avenue for future research would be to allow the economy to be
comprised of heterogeneous individuals in terms of their endowment of capital and study
growth related issues in that framework. The endogeneity of time preference might cause
the distribution of income to change as an economy embarks on its growth path.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
In order for the RR equation to be satis¯ed the marginal product of capital can never
fall below ¯
¡1 +± ¡1: This in turn implies that in any steady state equilibria the level of
capital has to exceed K from the strict concavity of F(:;N). A similar argument applies
for K.
Proof of Proposition 1:
If C = 0, then along the RR curve as K ! K, C ! 0. From the assumptions made about
the functions F(K;N) and ¯(C) we know that along the RR curve as K ! K; C ! 1.
Hence there would exist at least one steady state and that steady state is of type \H".
From the nature of the RR curve it follows that there must be one steady state of type
\L" between two steady states of type \H".
Proof of Lemma 2:
The existence of a type \H"steady state capital like K1 follows from Proposition 1. If
¯¡1( 1
FK(K0;N)+1¡±) < F(K0;N)¡±K0 then there is some value of capital for which the RR
curve is below the BC curve. Thus there is a steady state of type \L". The assumption
of FK(K;N) > ± then guarantees the existence of the second steady state of type \H".
Derivation of Equation 8:
Log-linearization of (5) around a steady state yields
c Kt+1 = ¯
¡1c Kt + s1 b Ct , (I)
where `^' denotes percentage deviation of the variable from its steady state value and
s1 = ¡C=K at steady state. From (3), we have
















s3 = 1 ¡ s2. We write the above equation more compactly as
¢1 b Ct + s3 b Át+1 = b ¸t , (II)
where ¢1 = [s2¾(C) + s3´¯(C)Á] < 0, from our previous assumptions.
From (4) we have











< 0, and ¿K = FK(K;N)¯(C) >
0.
From (7) we get






> 0. We rewrite the above equation as
b Át+2 ¡ b Át+1 = ¡¯
¡1¢2 b Ct+1 + ( ¯
¡1 ¡ 1) b Át+1 , (V)
where ¢2 = (1 ¡ ¯)²U(C) + ¯²¯(C) > 0. We can now use equations (I)-(V) to write
a system of di®erence equations in b Ct, b Át and c Kt where the dynamical system can be
expressed as
2





































s3(¯¡1 ¡ 1) ¯¡1
s3¯¡1¢2 ¡ ¢1
!






Proof of Proposition 2:
The roots of the polynomial det[M ¡ ¹I] = 0, will determine the behavior of the above
system.
det[M ¡ ¹I] = (¯
¡1 ¡ ¹)[(M11 ¡ ¹)(¯




¡1 ¡ ¹)[(M11 ¡ ¹)(¯
¡1 ¡ ¹) ¡ s1M13] .
Therefore ¹1 = ¯¡1 is one of the roots of the polynomial. The other two roots of det[M ¡
¹I] are the roots of the polynomial,
P(¹) = ¹




Now let us consider s3: From our de¯nition
s3 =
¯0(C) Á
















Therefore, we can write M11 =
Ã
















. Now consider the one kind of steady state SSH: In SSH the










or s1¿K ´F +²¯(1¡¯¡1) > 0. Conversely in the other kind of steady state SSL, s1¿K ´F +
²¯(1¡ ¯¡1) < 0. Therefore for SSH M11 > 1 and P(0) = ¯¡1M11 + M12¯¡1¢2 ¡s1M13 =¯¡1 > 0 , if real roots of the polynomial P(¹) exist then they must be positive. P(1) =
1¡¯¡1 ¡M11 + ¯¡1 = 1¡M11 < 0. Therefore around SSH there exists one eigenroot ¹3
which is less than one in absolute value. It is easy to show that the eigenroot ¹2 will be
greater than one. Hence, SSH is a saddle path and the system is locally unique around
the steady state. For the second part of the lemma, we split up the analysis of the roots
into various cases. Firstly, we note that
M11 + ¯
¡1 =
²¯(¯¡1 ¡ 1) + ²¯(1 ¡ ¯¡1) + s1¿K ´F ¡ ¢1(1 + ¯¡1)
²¯ ¡ ¢1
> 0 .
Case 1(Imaginary roots). The polynomial P(¹) will have imaginary roots if (M11+¯¡1)2 <
4¯¡1. The modulus of the imaginary roots will be
p
¯¡1 > 1.
Case 2. (Real and distinct roots) The polynomial P(¹) will have real and distinct roots if
(M11+¯¡1)2 > 4¯¡1. Around SSL, s1¿K ´F +²¯(1¡¯¡1) < 0, hence, M11 < 1. Therefore,
P(0) = ¯¡1 > 0, P(1) = 1 ¡ M11 > 0. The polynomial P(¹) attains a minimum at
M11+¯¡1
2 . Hence the roots will be greater than one in absolute value.
Case 3. (Real and repeated roots) The polynomial P(¹) will have real and repeated roots
if (M11+¯¡1)2 = 4¯¡1. This implies that M11+¯¡1 > 2. Hence the roots will be greater
than 1.
So SSL is a source and the system is locally unstable.
Proof of Proposition 3:
If the agent does not take into account the e®ect of current consumption on the probability
of survival then the ¯rst order conditions for an optimum would have to satisfy
U
0(Ct) = ¸t , (3')
(4) and (5). The steady state solutions to the agent's problem would have to satisfy
equations (BC) and (RR). Hence the existence of possible steady states is not a®ected.
Log-linearizing the ¯rst order conditions around steady state yields the following dynam-
ical system 2
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M11 0 M13
¡¯¡1(1 ¡ ¯)²U ¯¡1 0
s1 0 ¯¡1
3
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, (10)where M11 =
¾(C)¡¿K´Fs1¡²¯
¾(C) > 1 and M13 = ¡
¿K´F¯¡1
¾(C) < 0. The roots of the polynomial
det[M ¡ ¹I] = 0, will determine the behavior of the above system where
det[M ¡ ¹I] = (¯
¡1 ¡ ¹)[(M11 ¡ ¹)(¯
¡1 ¡ ¹) ¡ s1M13] .
Therefore ¹1 = ¯¡1 is one of the roots of the polynomial. The other two roots of det[M ¡
¹I] are the roots of the polynomial,
P(¹) = ¹
2 ¡ (M11 + ¯
¡1)¹ + ¯
¡1(1 ¡ ²¯=¾(C)):
Note that 1¡ ²¯=¾(C) <
¾(C)¡¿K´Fs1¡²¯
¾(C) = M11. The discriminant of the above quadratic
equation is D = (M11 + ¯¡1)2 ¡4¯¡1(1¡²¯=¾(C)) > (M11 + ¯¡1)2 ¡4¯¡1M11 = (M11 ¡




2 > 1. In order to show that the third root ¹3 is less than one, note that
P(0) = ¯¡1(1¡²¯=¾(C)) > 0. P(1) = 1¡¯¡1 ¡M11 +¯¡1(1¡²¯=¾(C)) < 0 if and only
if ¿K´Fs1 > (¯¡1¡1)²¯. So steady states of type \H" are locally stable and steady states
of type \L" are unstable.
Proof of Proposition 4:
From Lemma 1, we know that the steady state capital stock can never be less than K.
The (RR) curve is a vertical line until the subsistence level of consumption is reached.
If C > F(K;N) ¡ ±K, it imples that the (RR) curve will intersect the (BC) curve at
C = F(K;N) ¡ ±K and hence K = K, C = F(K;N) ¡ ±K will be a steady state
equilibrium. Log-linearization of the ¯rst order conditions around steady state yields the
following dynamical system
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¾(C) > 1 and M13 = ¡
¿K´¡1
F ¯
¾(C) < 0. It is easy to check that that
two roots of the polynomial det[M ¡ ¹I] = 0 are strictly greater than 1 and one root is
stricly less than 1. A similar argument applies for the steady state equilibrium K = K,
C = F(K;N) ¡ ±K:References
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